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Two Distinguished Professors 
By 
A. J. Thomas, Jr. 
On May 1st the School of Law 
lost two of its most distinguished 
professors when both Emeritus Pro-
fessor of Law Clyde Emery and 
Emeritus Professor of Law Arthur 
Leon Harding died after prolonged 
illnesses. The entire Law School 
Community was shaken and deeply 
saddened by their passing. Each of 
them contributed a major portion of 
their life to the Law School and we 
are all indebted to them for their 
insistence on excellence from their 
students. 
Clyde Emery was born in 1899 in 
Slater, Missouri. He received his 
Bachelor of Arts degree in 
Economics from the University of 
Wisconsin where he was a member 
of Phi Beta Kappa. He was awarded 
a Rhodes Scholarship and attended 
Oxford University and received his 
Bachelor of Laws degree from Har-
vard. Prior to teaching at SMU, he 
was an Associate Professor of Law 
at Baylor University. Professor 
Emery taught at SMU from 1938 
until his retirement in 1964 as Pro-
fessor Emeritus of Law. 
Former students will not forget 
Professor Emery's dedication to 
health and his energy method lec-
tures to first year students. He also 
lectured senior law students on 
techniques for legal briefing and 
how to maintain one's enthusiasm 
for the practice of law. He donated 
his booklet entitled A Streamlined 
Briefing Technique to the Law Stu-
dent Division of the American Bar 
Association which publishes and 
distributes the booklet. He was 
truly a "student's" professor and 
was never too busy to share his time 
and expertise with those that sought 
his counsel. 
Arthur Leon Harding, known to 
students as "The Colonel", was a 
native of Fayetteville, Arkansas. 
He received his Bachelor of Arts 
degree from the University of Ar-
kansas, his Juris Doctor degree 
from the University of Michigan 
and his Doctor of the Science of 
Law degree from Harvard Univer-
sity. Professor Harding taught at the 
School of Law from 1927 until 1933 
when he left Dallas for seven years 
to teach at the University ofldaho. 
He served in the Army during 
World War II and thereafter re-
turned to SMU to teach law until his 
retirement in 1972 as Professor 
Emeritus of Law. 
The Colonel was a true disciple of 
the Socratic method of teaching and 
tested the students each time they 
entered his classroom. He did not 
compromise in the search for legal 
efcellence but demanded no more 
of his students than he did from 
himself. 
I am thankful that I was able to 
share my career at SMU with both 
Clyde and Arthur. They were both 
extraordinary individuals, fine 
teachers and scholars of the law. 
Because of the interest shown by 
friends, alumni and the law school 
faculty, separate funds have been 
established in honor of both Profes-
sors Emery and Harding. Individu-
als desiring to make a contribution 
in their memory can make it to the 
Clyde Emery Memorial Book Fund 
or the Arthur Leon Harding Memo-
rial Fund. 
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An Interview With the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme (:ourt of India: 
The Honorable Y. V. Chandrachud 
FOREWORD 
On the evening of January 10, 
1979, the Chief Justice of the Sup-
reme Court of India, the Honorable 
Y. V. Chandrachud, granted an in-
terview for publication in The Brief 
The interview was conducted at the 
private residence of the Chief Justice 
in New Delhi, India. For forty-five 
minutes, the Honorable Y. V. Chan-
drachud responded candidly to a 
series of questions concerning the 
Constitution, the Legal System and 
the Government oflndia. On the fol-
lowing pages, the interview is rep-
resented as it was given that evening. 
To comprehend fully the import of 
Mr. Chandrachud's responses, it is 
necessary to place his explanations in 
the context of the country over which 
he presides as Chief Justice. 
India achieved independence from 
British rule on August 15, 1947. The 
Country became a Sovereign Demo-
cratic Republic on January 26, 1950, 
having enacted and adopted a writ-
ten Constitution on November 26, 
1949. Today, India is a country of 
complexities and considerations 
some of which vastly differ from con-
ditions within the United States. The 
Government of India must contend 
with a land which measures approx-
imately one-third the area of the Un-
ited States, but whose population 
more than triples that of America. 
Within a country of 1,262,275 square 
miles may be found a multitude in 
excess of 600 million people. 
Twenty-one States and nine Union 
Territories presently constitute the 
country of India. The governing 
body of India is the Parliament, 
comprised of the President of India 
and two Houses, known respectively 
as the Council of States and the 
House of the People. The Council of 
States is composed of twelve mem-
bers, individuals nominated by the 
President for their special knowledge 
or practical experience in the areas of 
literature, science, art and social ser-
vice. The Council of States addition-
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ally consists of not more than 250 
representatives of the States and 
Union Territories, selected by the 
elected members of the State Legisla-
tive Assembly. The House of the 
People consists of not more than 525 
members chosen by direct election 
from territorial constituencies within 
the States and of not more than 25 
members representing the Union 
Territories. 
The Government of India is ap-
propriately described as "federal in 
structure but unitary in spirit.'' Like 
other federations, India possesses a 
written constitution with powers 
clearly distributed between the Cent-
ral Government and the Units--the 
States and Territories. India also 
possesses a Supreme Court estab-
lished to interpret the Constitution 
and to decide disputes between the 
Central Government and the Units. 
But the Indian Government has a dis-
tinctive unitary composition. One 
Constitution has been adopted not 
only for the Union but also for the 
various States. Equality of status 
with the Central Government has not 
been accorded to the States and 
Union Territories. India's unitary 
structure is further evidenced by 
provision within its Constitution for 
a single citizenship and a single in-
tegrated judiciary. 
The highest court of the land is the 
Supreme Court of India, situated in 
New Delhi. The Constitution oflndia 
vests the Supreme Court with origi-
nal and appellate jurisdication as 
well as advisory powers. Appeals to 
the Supreme Court may be taken in 
any civil or criminal matter from any 
judgment, decree or final order of a 
High Court-the equivalent of a 
State Supreme Court in America-if 
the High Court certifies that the case 
involves a substantial question of law 
as to the interpretation of the Con-
stitution. Alternatively, the Supreme 
Court may grant special leave to ap-
peal from such judgment, decree or 
final order if satisfied that the case 
involves a substantial question of law 
with regard to the interpretation of 
the Constitution and the High Court 
has refused certification. Appeals to 
the High Court of a State or Territ-
ory are taken from the lower or Dis-
trict Courts. Finally, the Constitu-
tion of India provides for the estab-
lishment of a common High Court for 
two or more States. 
It is with knowledge of this gov-
ernmental structure and judicial or-
ganization that the Honorable Chief 
Justice's answers to the following 
questions achieve their proper sig-
nificance. Mr. Chandrachud's re-
sponses were contextually directed to 
the unique conditions and com-
plexities of India. Some of the ques-
tions posed difficulties. But the Chief 
Justice was, at all times, gracious and 
candid. The Editorial Staff of The 
Brief is greatly appreciative of the 
opportunity for this interview af-
forded by the Honorable Y. V. 
Chandrachud, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of India. 
Interviewed by Jacqueline Varma 
Honorable Chief Justice Chan-
drachud, would you briefly tell of 
your legal background before you 
were appointed to the position of Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of India? 
I practiced in Bombay as a lawyer 
for approximately 17 or 18 years. 
Thereafter, I became a Judge of the 
High Court of Bombay in 1961. 
Acording to Article 124 of the Indian 
Constitution, the President of India 
is to appoint the Chief Justice and all 
the Supreme Court Justices. Were 
you in fact appointed by the Presi-
dent of India? 
That is correct. I was appointed 
by the President in consultation 
with the Chief Justice of the Bench, 
(continued on page 6) 
President's Report 
A Year of Transition 
Edward A. Copley 
President, SMU Law Alumni Association 
1978-1979 
From the viewpoint of the Law 
School alumni, the last fiscal year 
was significant in two major re-
spects. First, it regettably marked 
the year in which Dean Charles 0. 
Galvin resigned as the Dean of the 
School of Law. Dean Galvin's 
prominence at the Law School, in 
Dallas, and nationwide is well 
known; his relationship with the 
alumni of the Law School has been 
outstanding. When he became Dean 
in 1963, there were approximately 
2,000 alumni of the Law School. 
Today, there are 5,100 alumni lo-
cated throughout the world. During 
his term as Dean, this statistical in-
crease of over two and a half times 
the number of alumni is a mere 
numerical indication of Dean Gal-
vin's and the Law School's growth. 
The quality of the Law School 
can be measured in many ways. 
Buildings and libraries are one 
criteria, and an important one. The 
most important criteria is people-
faculty, students, and alumni. The 
practicing legal professional mea-
sures the quality of the School by 
the students it hires and by the 
alumni with which it works. Under 
Dean Galvin's deanship, the quality 
and the reputation of all three of 
these groups has grown, and the 
alumni is indeed indebted to him for 
his leadership and dedication. 
The second significant event of 
the fiscal year was the conducting of 
the Law School Fund, headed by 
Robert L. (Skip) Trimble. At the 
time of the writing of this report, the 
fund drive for the current year has 
been successfully completed. In the 
Winter issue of The Brief, Bill Pow-
ell made a strong case for the con-
tinuation of a vital, independent 
Law School Fund. His arguments 
then are still valid. The importance 
of the alumni support to the Law 
School Fund cannot be underesti-
mated. Just recently, a change in the 
time of the annual Law School Fund 
has been authorized by the alumni 
council. Specifically, next year's 
fund drive will be conducted at the 
same time as the general SMU sus-
tentation drive. While this might in-
volve some logistical adjustments in 
the first year, in the long run, the 
change should result in a more pro-
ductive campaign. I solicit your 
strong support for the Law School, 
not just financially, but your sup-
port in the participation of Law 
School activities. 
Twenty years ago it seems that a 
graduate could expect to spend his 
legal life structuring and resolving 
relationships between private par-
ties and to have some involvement 
with government regulation 
(primarily, taxes and securities.) 
Today, a graduate expects to deal 
with a body of private law, which is 
exceedingly complex, and can an-
ticipate every day contact with gov-
ernment bodies and regulatory 
agencies, the nomenclature of 
which has exhausted the alphabet. 
No wonder that three times the 
number of law graduates are admit-
ted to the bar annually than was the 
case twenty years ago. These condi-
tions illustrate the necessity of 
alumni support to insure that the 
students who graduate from SMU 
Law School are of the highest qual-
ity. 
As I was about to mail this report 
to the editor, sad news reached us. 
On the same day, ironically Law 
Day, May 1, 1979, two beloved 
members of the law school family 
passed away: Clyde Emery and Ar-
thur L. Harding. Who could ever 
forget the impact of these two men 
on their legal training? Each was 
unique, different from the other in 
style and personality. But in two 
ways that come to mind, they were 
so similar. Each was totally dedi-
cated to the law and the legal pro-
fession, and each was highly re-
spected and loved by the many stu-
dents they trained. Each was the 
epitome of the word "Professor." 




The Student Bar Association 
made a $1,000 gift for the establish-
ment of an endowment fund at the 
Underwood Law Library in honor 
of Dean Charles O. Galvin. The 
fund, officially entitled "The 
Charles 0. Galvin Library Endow-
ment Fund," will be used for the 
acquisition of books, materials and 
supplies for the Law Library. 
John Hecker, Vice-President of 
the SBA, announced the establish-
ment of the fund and acknowledged 
the 15 years of superior leadership 
provided by Dean Galvin to the 
School. Hecker encouraged stu-
dents, former students and all in-
terested parties to join with the SBA 
and contribute to this fund in honor 
of Dean Galvin. 5 
the Chief Justice of India. 
Article 124 (3) (a), (b), (c) states that 
the Supreme Court Justices are to be 
chosen from the High Court Judges, 
the High Court Advocates and from 
among distinguished jurists. How 
are the names of such judges and ad-
vocates submitted to the President? 
Generally, the convention is that 
the Chief Justice of India, after 
some informal consultation with his 
colleagues, will receive the names 
of those who are the most suitable 
from amongst the practicing 
lawyers and the High Court Judges 
for appointment to the Supreme 
Court. The Chief Justice will then 
discuss the names submitted to him 
with the Law Minister of the Central 
Government and thereafter forward 
the names to the Prime Minister. 
Thereafter, there may be some dis-
cussion between the Law Minister 
and the Prime Minister and perhaps 
a name may be eliminated. But gen-
erally, the Chief Justice's recom-
mendations are accepted by the 
Government. 
Is Parliament required to approve 
the selection of Chief Justice made by 
the President? 
No, selection of the Chief Justice 
does not require the approval of Par-
liament. 
The Constitution does not refer to the 
Prime Minister, with the exception of 
Articles 74 and 75 calling for a Coun-
cil of Ministers consisting of a Prime 
Minister appointed by the President 
and the other ministers appointed by 
the President on the advice of the 
Prime Minister. Would you explain 
the relationship between the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister and the 
Council of Ministers? 
So far as the President is con-
cerned, whenever our Constitution 
by and large states that some con-
stitutional obligation or duty must 
be discharged by the President, it 
means really with the aid and advice 
of the Cabinet of Ministers, the 
Council of Ministers. Therefore, 
when the President appoints a Judge 
of the Supreme Court or Chief Jus-
tice of India, the appointment is in 
fact made with the aid and advice of 
his Council of Ministers. 
Why does the Constitution oflndia so 
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often mention the President when in 
reality it is the Prime Minister who 
discharges the official duties man-
dated by the Constitution? 
It is not really the Prime Minister 
who performs the official functions. 
It is the Council of Ministers headed 
by the Prime Minister. The C_on-
stitution does not refer to the Pnme 
Minister for three significant 
reasons. If the Constitution merely 
mentioned the Prime Minister, then 
the functions executed by the other 
Ministers would be excluded. Sec-
ondly, if only the Prime Minister or 
Council of Ministers were men-
tioned then there would be no offi-
cial d~ties for the President to dis-
charge. If, for example, the Con-
stitution were to provide that the 
appointment of the Chief Justice of 
India shall be executed by the 
Council of Ministers, the President 
will have no Constitutional obliga-
tion to discharge. And finally, the 
reference to the President in our 
Constitution serves another very 
significant purpose. The President 
does not belong to any particular 
(political) party. Therefore, there is 
a certain amount of dispassionate 
neutrality and some degree of non-
political examination of the problef!l 
at issue. And even though the Presi-
dent himself may not be able to di-
rect or require an appointment, he is 
at least able to make suggestions 
and counter-suggestions. He is able 
to request the Council of Ministers 
to re-examine the question and re-
consider the alternatives. The fact 
that reconsideration of any Con-
stitutional or political problem may 
be requested by a non-partisan Pres-
ident is an important contribution. 
But in fact, does not Article 74 man-
date that the President shall follow 
the advice of the Council of Minis-
ters? 
That is correct. The President is 
really bound by the advice tendered 
to him by the Council of Ministers. 
Whenever the people of India state 
that the President has appointed the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
it is the Council of Ministers in real-
ity. More particularly, in the case of 
the Chief Justice, it is the Prime 
Minister who has the dominant 
voice in the matter, although the 
Prime Minister will perhaps also 
have the assistance of the Law 
Minister. 
But the selection of the Chief Jus-
tice cannot involve the entire 
Cabinet of Ministers. You see, there 
are twenty-five Ministers of the 
Cabinet rank. A large number of 
these Ministers will not have any 
intimate knowledge of the particular 
matter at issue-in this case, selec-
tion of a Chief Justice. For example, 
a Minister in charge of housing may 
be a very eminent person in his own 
area and may have very valuable 
information on the subject which 
concerns his ministry. But whether 
a law is beneficial or not, whether a 
Judge is qualified or not, are matters 
which do not really fall within the 
normal course of his duties. So as to 
the appointment of a Chief Justice, 
there is little contribution that such 
a Minister can make. 
In the United States, many Con-
gressmen possess a law degree. Is the 
Council of Ministers similarly com-
prised of lawyer-politicians? 
Currently, almost all of the Coun-
cil of Ministers are very highly edu-
cated. You will seldom find a 
member of the Council of Ministers 
who is not a (college) graduate. And 
in most of the cases, the Minister is 
a double graduate. Most of the 
Ministers are very highly qualified 
academically. But not all of them 
are lawyers, although the percen-
tage of lawyers is also quite high 
among the members of our legisla-
ture. A large number of the Minis-
ters do in fact have legal qualifica-
tions. Although they may not have 
practiced, many of our Council 
members have studied law. 
I believe Article 124 mandates that 
there shall be no more than seven 
Judges of the Supreme Court. Is that 
the present number of Supreme 
Court Justices? 
No. When the Constitution was 
first enacted, the Supreme Court 
consisted of seven Judges. But 
there has been an amendment and 
the number of Supreme Court 
Judges is sixteen. Actually, under 
the amendment, the number has 
been increased to eighteen and this 
ceiling cannot be exceeded until 
( continued on page 11) 
Among the Kapauku Papuans, a 
headman unobtrusively approaches 
an argument between two men. 
After quietly listening, he begins 
questioning the participants infor-
mally, occasionally seeking the 
opinions of others. He then offers a 
solution to the dispute. When this 
avails no agreement, he alterna-
tively threatens and pleads, weeps 
and shouts, dances and harangues 
until at last the resolution is ac-
cepted and the dispute settled. 
In the New Guinea Highlands, 
another leader confronts a marriage 
dispute by silently bringing to it his 
bow and quiver. Without speaking, 
he sits calmly and begins sharpening 
his arrows. The dispute quickly 
ends: a year earlier, he had settled a 
similar quarrel by shooting one who 
had violated the peace. The implica-
tion and prognosis are not lost on 
the present participants, although 
not a word has been spoken. 
Are these instances of legal be-
havior? Do these non-literate 
societies entertain the rule of 
"law"? These questions are impor-
tant to the anthropologist for 
reasons which define the goals and 
methods of anthropological re-
search: to understand human sys-
tems through a comparative and 
cross-cultural approach. That such 
understanding involves making 
valid generalizations about those 
systems (both social and biologi-
cal), and thus distinguishing the 
unique from the pervasive, lends 
special character to this young and 
frequently controversial science. 
The advantages of this approach 
Is Law Part of 
The Human Estate? 
by Ronald K. Wetherington 
Professor of Anthropology 
Southern Methodist University 
to law to those whose interests are 
the practice of law and the conduct 
of American jurisprudence are more 
than purely intellectual. The dis-
covery that rights and obligations 
are effectively promulgated and 
preserved in a variety of cir-
cumstances not involving codifica-
tion contributes to our appreciation 
of the advantages as well as the limi-
tations oflegal statutes and abstract 
rules. The revelation that the ef-
ficiency of social control is not 
everywhere a function of physically 
coercive sanctions lends insight to 
our present concern over the rela-
tionships among law, order, and 
punishment. It is furthermore in-
structive in understanding or pro-
moting social change to discover 
which elements in Western law are 
fundamental to the human estate 
and which products of a particular 
historical legacy. 
Let me be quick to deny any claim 
that the anthropological study of 
law is a panacea-in-waiting for prac-
titioners who wish to understand 
the law. This was the conviction of 
Mr. Justice Holmes, however, and 
its approach was espoused by the 
jurist Roscoe Pound, among others. 
I claim only that the comparative 
non-Western approach reveals the 
fundamental countenance of law 
and its essential form. 
The two incidents in the opening 
paragraphs are described by the 
foremost scholar in the field, 
Leopold Pospisil (1972), the first 
from his own field research and the 
second from that of Edwin Cook. 
The cases illustrate the operation of 
law in societies without codified sta-
tutes or formal judicial process. 
Thus, substantively, procedurally, 
and structurally, they would fall 
outside the Western definition of 
law espoused by many. 
The cases do reflect four essential 
elements which, according to Pos-
pisil, qualify them as possessing the 
character of law. These are: 1) the 
existence of authority, whether ves-
ted in an individual or a group; 2) the 
intention, whether explicit or im-
plicit, of universal application; 3) 
the recognition of obligatio, a term 
referencing the social (and legal) re-
lationship of the parties to a dispute, 
pointing both to the duties of the 
defendant and the rights of the per-
son or persons which were violated 
by the delict; and 4) the presence of 
a sanction - whether positive or 
negative, physical or psychological 
- which may be invoked by the 
authority in threat or in fact to en-
force the decision in a dispute. 
The further - and more elaborate 
- description of these elements is 
found in Pospisil's Anthropology of 
Law. It may be argued that these, at 
best, constitute the criteria for judg-
ing a decision to be legal, but do not 
constitute law per se. After all, a 
legal decision is not only one which 
exercises social control, but one 
which has the weight of "the law" 
behind it, not intrinsically within it. 
This raises the question, there-
fore, of what the essential structure 
of form of law is - one where one 
searches to find "law". The herit-
age of Western law, particularly in 
( continued on next page) 7 
its early ties to the Twelve Tables of 
Rome and the subsequent codifica-
tions of Justinian, emphasi~es 
abstract rules as the ultimate basis 
of legal behavior (for example, in 
the seminal Ancient Law by Sir 
Henry Maine). Thus to many, the 
absence of a set of abstract rules or 
principles - codified guides to the 
correction of delicts - signifies the 
absence of law. This criterion, if 
applied thoroughly, would exclude 
most non-Western societies from 
rule by law, and would furthermore 
include as law in Western societies 
those norms and rules which are 
either "dead" or have no longer the 
meaning they once had and are thus 
not literally enforced. 
The essential form of law which 
Pospisil accepts as critical is the 
legal decision and the principles 
which may be abstracted from it. 
His approach, following Holmes 
and John Austin, as well as notable 
anthropologists such as Hoebel, 
Smith and Roberts, and Nader, is 
analytical and casuistic. In the use 
of case studies of actual decisions, 
from which legal principles and the 
structure of law are extracted, the 
scientist, Pospisil claims, can 
''make the concept of law exact, 
cross-culturally comparative, and 
universal" (Pospisil, 1972 at 14). It 
is moreover in casuistic analysis 
that change in the meaning oflaws, 
and the social structure within 
which law occurs, may be recorded. 
This reveals law as it actually af-
fects behavior rather than as it ide-
ally should influence it. 
By this argument, then, both the 
form and the substance of law are 
best discovered in the decisions 
made by legal authorities. This en-
compasses the notion oflaw by pre-
cedent rather than by abstract rule, 
and allows the four attributes previ-
ously noted to serve as the 
touchstone to comparative analysis 
of the nature of law. 
Scholars influenced by our West-
ern jurisprudential heritage can find 
reasons to object to this notion of 
law on several counts. Perhaps 
most central in the tradition of 
Western law is the notion of 
abstract rules which embody legal 
principles and guide the administra-
tion of justice. A formal legalistic 
view would restrict law to codes and 
statutes, whether written or recal-
led, and thus eliminate from the 
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purview of law all behavior not so 
ordained. However, one may argue 
that such a distinction makes law a 
more arbitrary and less workable 
concept, even in our own society. 
This is notwithstanding the myth 
still reverently espoused that the 
only proper function of the jurist in 
treating a social act is to find the law 
and apply it, not to create it. 
This ideal was firmly commended 
by Holmes himself, despite his ad-
vocacy of the casuistic approach, in 
the landmark case of Buck v Bell. 
"The law", he wrote 
does all that is needed when it 
does all that it can, indicates a 
policy, applies it to all within the 
lines, and seeks to bring within 
the lines all similarly situated so 
far as so fast as its means allow. 
(274 U.S. 208) 
While the ideal may provide a 
foundation for the legal process, 
few would hesitate to admit that 
creative insight (or, less presump-
tuously, circumstantial innovation) 
not only plays a critical part in main-
taining the law's vitality, but fre-
quently changes its interpreted 
meaning. We may ask, for example, 
where an adequate understanding of 
civil rights law may be genuinely 
acquired: in the legislative acts of 
1954 et. seq., or in the interpretive 
evolutionary steps between Brown 
v Board of Education and Regents 
of the University of California v 
Allan Bakke. 
Furthermore, and from the other 
side of the legalistic coin as noted 
previously, a restriction of•' law'' to 
"abstract rules" would include the 
numerous "dead rules" which, 
whether obsolete or relatively re-
cent, are never applied. These are 
common in state and local statutes, 
and each of us 'probably has favorite 
examples. These exist, indeed, in 
societies without written codes as 
well, and if law is a means of in-
stitutionalized social control their 
inclusion thereby gives a misrep-
resentation, particularly for the an-
thropologist. A particularly fretful 
example is the rule prohibiting in-
cest, differentially defined in many 
societies on the basis of fictive kin-
ship, and often as differentially fol-
lowed in practice. 
It is more appropriately the prin-
ciples behind the codified laws, as 
these are revealed, crystallized, and 
made explicit in legal decisions, and 
not the abstract codifications them-
selves, that provide us with the 
tools for analysis and comparison. 
More than the statutes themselves, 
the concrete application of their 
principles reveal the structure of 
law in society, When this is ac-
cepted, the structure of law may be 
found even in the absence of codi-
fication. 
The confusion of the two con-
cepts, central to Western law, 
comes from their being combined in 
the English word "law". They are 
terminologically distinguished in 
other societies with codified laws: 
the Latin lex and French loi refer-
ring to abstract rules or statutes, 
with ius and droit, respectively, de-
noting the fundamental legal princi-
ples which guide social behavior. It 
is little wonder that Fried finds as 
"almost untranslatable" the defini-
tion by the French anthropologist 
Marcel Mauss, ••Law (le droit com-
prises the totality of customs and 
laws (les lois)" (Fried, 1967 at 17; 
translation mine). 
Restrictive definitions of author-
ity and sanction, which are related 
concepts, likewise plague the West-
ern scholar seeking law in non-
Western societies. Authority, par-
ticularly in legal context, implies 
power which is legitimized within 
the social group, although formally 
the terms may be separate. To 
Fried, both terms refer to "the abil-
ity to channel the behavior of 
others," power employing the use 
of sanctions, and authority referring 
to such ability in the absence of 
sanctions. In the present sense, 
legal authority involves power: a 
legal decision must be binding on 
those whom it covers. 
To some scholars, the test oflegal 
authority, therefore, lies in the na-
ture of the sanctions available, the 
criterion being that the sanctions 
carry sufficient threat to coerce 
obedience of the authority's deci-
sions. This was the position held by 
John Austin, who developed the 
analytical school of jurisprudence. 
(For a brief but good survey, see 
Barnes, 1974). Such sanctions, ac-
cording to scholars such as Hoebel, 
must be physical in nature - either 
in threat or in administration - in 
order to qualify as legal. If we carry 
this line of reasoning further, we 
find that the coercive use of force is 
seldom found in legitimized au-
thorities without sovereign power, 
( continued on page JO) 
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that sovereignty exists only in the 
political state, and thus that law, 
given this attribute as a criterion, is 
confined to the political state. An 
escape from this dilemma is the rec-
ognition that physical coercion, 
along with a vested monopoly in the 
use of force, is not a necessary 
adjunct to legal authority, although 
in the state it is often its most prom-
inent one. 
The criteria discussed above, 
when judiciously applied cross-
culturally, reveal that no adequately 
studied society is without law. Even 
among the primitive bands of 
hunters-gatherers, whose numbers 
continue to diminish in the 
Kalahari, the Arctic, in Tierra del 
Fuego, on the Australian outback, 
particular cases may be observed in 
which the decisions of headmen or 
leaders take the guise of legal au-
thority. Notwithstanding the cajol-
ing and whining, nor the obvious 
informality with which a decision is 
reached, all of the elements are fre-
quently present. 
First, the authority is acknow-
ledged as such, apparent from the 
acquiescence by all parties to have 
him intercede, arbitrate, decide. No 
matter whether that authority is 
given to him because of his skill and 
impartiality rather than because of 
any formally assigned power he 
commands. 
Second, his eventually reached 
decision or opinion reflects an inten-
tion to establish or maintain a pre-
cedent: that similar future disputes 
will receive similar disposition. It is 
no matter if the decision is reached 
because of custom or tradition 
rather than through the application 
of a codified rule. 
Third, the decision or recom-
mendation observes the particular 
social relationship which was se-
vered by the cause of the dispute. It 
recognizes, as much as does the fac-
tual basis for a verdict in our West-
ern courts, the reciprocal rights and 
duties of the opposed participants. 
It is irrelevant whether these derive 
ultimately from kinship, from an 
economic relationship, or from 
ritual ties. 
Fourth, sanction to encourage 
acceptance of the decision is 
sufficiently strong and emanates 
from the decision: that is to say, 
recognition of the authority by the 
participants is recognition of a 
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commensurate power behind his 
decision. That he is more than a 
mediator-without-portfolio is re-
vealed by the infrequency with 
which his decisions are ignored. 
While the decision may in some 
cases be achieved by cajoling to 
mutual agreement, the decision 
once made is followed on pain of 
sanctions which, though frequently 
sumptuary, are quite effective. 
Moral sanctions in a kin-based so-
cial structure, we should recognize, 
are often as compelling as any for-
mal legal sanction in our society -
sometimes more so. 
We can be deceived into defining 
as law only the formal and substan-
tive qualities of Western jurispru-
dence. In so doing, we miss the rich 
diversity of instruments for social 
control under which a significant 
fraction of the world's population 
lives in orderly - and ordered -
life cycles. Rather than to suggest 
that, at a certain stage of social 
evolution, "law" enters the reper-
toire of means to organize behavior, 
it may be more instructive to con-
ceptualize law as a procedural in-
strument in all societies, becoming 
more complex, explicit, and com-
partmentalized where society itself 
does. 
In science generally, an attempt is 
made to seek universal principles in 
particular phenomena. The an-
thropological approach to law is no 
different, and analytical categories 
are often best viewed as arbitrary 
subdivisions of continuous things. 
The continuum of social behavioral 
control is thus frequently sub-
divided into the hierarchical se-
quence of habit-code-rule-law much 
as we distinguish the sequence 
bay-sea-ocean. Such subdivisions 
are analytically useful despite their 
abstraction from the "real world." 
One may say they are necessary be-
cause they abstract. 
Thus law, once arbitrarily 
categorized for analytical purposes, 
may provide the anthropologist 
with useful distinctions. Its source 
may range from customary to au-
thoritarian, authority may run from 
limited to absolute, and sanctions 
may be psychological, sumptuary, 
economic, or corporal. 
In analysis based on new distinc-
tions, new "truths" about the na-
ture of social conduct may be re-
vealed. With the criteria discussed 
above, for example, Pospisil notes 
that law in society occurs at numer-
ous levels below the law of society 
- that in fact some ethnically, 
geographically, and linguistically 
defined societies may not be unified 
under law, while societal segments 
therein may be guided by strong 
legal authority. 
Where the critieria coalesce, we 
have the presence oflaw. In the cal-
culus of other approaches, law is 
present only in civilized societies. 
The final test of validity is, of 
course, not whether one or another 
approach is the "right" one. It is 
rather which approach most en-
lightens us and informs our ignor-
ance. With the advance of civiliza-
tion in time and geography, com-
parative cross-cultural study is 
questioning much of what we arrog-
antly call civilized; is challenging 
our exclusive claim to law and jus-
tice. The challenge is at once 
peremptory and for cause. 
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there is a further amendment. 
Would you explain how the Supreme 
Court Justices arrive at a majority 
decision? In the United States there 
are nine Justices, which allows for a 
5-4 majority. But when there are 16 
or 18 Justices, this even-number 
would appear to allow for a split-
decision? 
Within the United States Sup-
reme Court, the entire Court sits for 
every matter. We do not. That is 
one fundamental distinction be-
tween the way we work and the way 
the United States Supreme Court 
works. We sit in benches. Gener-
ally, our Constitution Bench will 
consist of five Judges only. And the 
other eleven Judges will sit in 
benches of two and three to hear 
other matters. 
In other words, on any one day, sev-
eral cases may be argued and adjudi-
cated simultaneously? 
Yes, at any one time, several 
cases are heard. We have five or six 
courts which hear cases concur-
rently. From among the eleven Jus-
tices, four courts may be comprised 
of two Judges each, with one Court 
of three Judges, which will consti-
tute the fifth court. This fifth court is 
the Constitution Court. So at the 
same time, we are six courts sitting. 
And when the Constitution Court is 
not sitting, then we are able to have 
six or seven Courts. Generally, 
when the Constitution Bench is not 
convened, we normally sit in a 
Bench of three. 
Is there a minimum number of Jus-
tices per Bench? 
The minimum number has to be 
two. A single Judge cannot decide 
anything. 
What happens, then, if each of the 
two Justices should decide differently 
on the same point of law? 
If two Judges do not agree, then a 
third Judge will join them. Or the 
Chief Justice will constitute another 
Bench of three Judges. You see, 
five Judges is the minimum for Con-
stitutional matters. But we have a 
large amount of work which is not 
constitutional at all-cases which 
do not arise under the Constitution. 
For example, a private suit between 
A & B or a criminal prosecution 
which does not involve any con-
stitutional question. 
These latter cases which do not in-
volve a constitutional issue are ap-
peals from the High Courts of the 
States? 
Quite right. These are appeals 
from the High Courts. 
Article 124 (2) states that mandatory 
retirement for the Supreme Court 
Judges must occur at age 65. Is this 
always the case or are exceptions ever 
made? 
The age of retirement for the Su-
preme Court Judges is 65. This is 
mandated. No exception can be 
made because, under the Constitu-
tion, no one can sit as a Judge of the 
Supreme Court after he attains the 
age of 65. 
I believe the Indian Constitution 
provides for a pension for Supreme 
Court Justices upon retirement? 
Yes. There is a scale according to 
which the pension is admissible to 
retiring Judges . Although the pen-
sions have been increased, we do 
not receive the same amount 
through the pension as we receive 
through our pay. 
What percentage of the Judge's sal-
ary does the pension represent? 
As an example, the salary of the 
Chief Justice of India is approxi-
mately 4,000 rupees a month ($625 
per month), and some small al-
lowances in addition. My salary is 
now 5,000 rupees a month, plus 
some sumptuary allowance of 500 
rupees ($62.50) and a car allowance 
of 300 rupees ($37.50) and a free 
official residence in which I am re-
siding presently. Those are the 
terms of my appointment. The 
maximum pension, therefore, 
which I would be entitled to is 
36,000 rupees ($4,500) a year. 
The official salary of the Chief Jus-
tice amounts to slightly over $600 per 
month. It would appear that accept-
ing the position of Chief Justice or 
Judge of the Supreme Court would 
constitute a financial sacrifice? 
A great amount of sacrifice is in-
volved in accepting the Judgeship in 
India for a member of the Bar. The 
Judgeships are normally offered to 
the leading members of the Bar. In 
fact, at the time that I was appointed 
a Judge, I was in a fairly large prac-
tice. But when my Chief Justice of 
the High Court asked me whether I 
could accept the Judgeship, I very 
readily agreed. It was a very great 
honor to become a Judge and there-
fore I did not mind. 
Unfortunately, today, money has 
really lost its value. The value of the 
rupee has fallen and members of the 
Bar are really not too eager to ac-
cept a Judgeship. Because, you see, 
one cannot really compare his in-
come as a lawyer with his salary as a 
Judge, however large the salary 
may be. 
But what of the remunerations apart 
from the Judge's salary? I should 
think that assuming the position of 
Judge of the Supreme Court of India 
would provide one of the most sig-
nificant ways to influence and affect 
the practice of law? 
Well, it is very rewarding work 
that the Judge does. Life does not 
totally consist of making so much 
money or not making so much 
money. And if everyone said ''un-
less a large amount of money was 
involved," he would not do his 
work, then we would have no courts 
of law at all in India. 
Which has been the most important 
or meaningful decision to you, since 
your appointment as Chief Justice? 
It is very difficult to pinpoint any 
particular decision as being of the 
greatest significance because I have 
participated in quite a few important 
decisions. But one of the most im-
portant decisions in which I was a 
participant was the case known as 
the ''fundamental rights'' case-
Keshavand Bharti, 1973, S.C.R.I. 
I became a Judge of the Supreme 
Court in August 1972. The hearing 
in Keshavand Bharti began in 
November, 1972 and lasted four 
months. We delivered our judge~ 
ment in April of 1973. 
Keshavand Bharti concerned the 
question as to whether the funda-
mental rights provisions of the Con-
stitution could be amended by vir-
tue of the powers conferred by Arti-
cle 368--the "amending clause"-
so as to restrict, abridge or take 
away these fundamental rights. At 
that time, the provision of the Con-
stitution allowed for fourteen Su-
preme Court Judges. We were thir-
teen Judges in Keshavand-the 
( continued on next page) 
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largest that has sat in the Supreme 
Court. The entire Court was thus 
occupied with hearing one case and 
nothing else. Lawyers were com-
plaining that their cases were piling 
up and there was no Supreme Court 
to ask for a determination about 
matters such as bail or early hear-
ings. Therefore, it was necessary to 
appoint one more Judge and two 
more ad hoc Judges so that a Bench 
of three Judges could hear some 
other matters. 
The main argument in Keshavand 
Bharti was made on behalf of the 
petitioners by Mr. Palakhwala, who 
is now our Ambassador to the Un-
ited States. We were divided in our 
decision 7 to 6. I was among the 
minority of 6. But it was held by 
the majority of 7 that the power of 
amendment of the Constitution 
shall not be exercised so as to take 
away the fundamental rights of the 
people. In fact, a new theory was 
evolved by the majority-that there 
are certain basic features of the 
Constitution and you cannot amend 
the Constitution so as to destroy 
those basic features. For example, 
the basic feature of the Constitution 
that India is a democracy cannot be 
amended so as to make India a 
monarchy. 
But your vote in Keshavand was 
among the dissenting voices? 
Yes, I was among the minority of 
6. I held that the power to amend 
is a very broad and untrammeled 
power. The people possess the 
power to amend in any manner as 
the chosen representatives of the 
people may desire. In fact, I was in 
favor of allowing amendments with 
regard to any matter that Parliament 
may wish. I said, in Keshavand, 
that the power to amend can be 
exercised even so as to scrap the 
Constitution and replace it by 
another Constitution. I said that no 
generation has the right to say that it 
will really bind all future genera-
tions. Life can interpose such vast 
changes that succeeding genera-
tions may think that the Constitu-
tion which was enacted some years 
back is wholly inadequate for meet-
ing the new challenges of the times. 
Would you describe briefly how the 
Indian Constitution may be 
amended. 
The power to amend can be found 
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in Article 368, which provides for 
the entire procedure. Amendment is 
by two-thirds vote of each House of 
Parliament. And there are some 
provisions of the Constitution for 
which ratification by the State Gov-
ernments is also necessary. An 
amendment which directly affects 
the State will require ratification by 
that State. 
As you are aware, the Supreme 
Court of the United States has re-
cently rendered the Bakke decision, 
holding that race may be a factor 
when an applicant is considered for 
admission into state supported uni-
versities. However, race may not 
generally be a factor upon which to 
base a quota system for admitting 
applicants, particularly if there is no 
evidence of past discrimination by 
the university. Do you view Bakke as 
having any import for the Judiciary 
of India or any impact upon India's 
socioeconomic structure? 
At the present time, I do not re-
gard the decision in Bakke as having 
any direct applicability to the condi-
tions of India. 
Three articles of the Indian Constitu-
tion mandate equality before the law. 
Article 14 contains the general provi-
sions of equality before the law and 
equal protection of the laws; Article 
16 mandates equality of employment 
opportunities; and Article 29 re-
quires equality of education for all 
with regard to state supported uni-
versities. Would you ex-
plain the apparent inconsistency of 
Article 15 (4) which allows for special 
provisions for educationally and so-
cially backward citizens? 
But you see, Article 15 (4) is not 
contradictory because the very 
basis of the theory of equality is that 
equal persons should be treated 
equally. Now if there are socially 
backward persons, economically 
backward persons, then such per-
sons are not equal with others. So, 
therefore, special provisions ought 
to be made for their advancement. 
Now, in fact, it is a violation of 
the equality clause contained in Ar-
ticle 14 to treat unequals as equals, 
because equality is for equals. For 
example, if socially there are un-
equal persons, then one common 
law for the lion and the lamb is not 
equality. It is inequality. There is a 
definite need for classification. 
Even the doctrine of equality allows 
for a classification to be made, 
thereby permitting persons who are 
classified differently to be treated 
differently. You can give different 
treatment to persons who are placed 
in different classes. But you can 
only classify persons differently 
under Article 14 provided there 
exists some rational basis for clas-
sifying them differently. 
I would like to ask you about your 
decision in State of U. P. v. Pradip 
Trandon, AIR 1975 SC 563, which 
held that "reservation of seats for 
medical students in Medical Colleges 
for candidates from rural areas is 
unconstitutional." Would you exp-
lain why special consideration for 
rural candidates has been disal-
lowed, in light of article 15 (4)? 
The question to discern is really 
this-are the individuals who seek 
special consideration really 
economically backward? Are they 
socially backward? 
The rationale of the Pradip Tran-
don decision can only be that rural 
candidacy is not a valid basis of 
classification. Because, you see, 
you must find some differentia, 
some characteristics which distin-
guish those who are classified or put 
in a class from those who are left out 
of that class. Now, rural and non-
rural is no classification for there 
can be advanced people or econom-
ically advanced people in the rural 
areas. So to say merely that you live 
in a rural area and therefore there 
shall be some reservation or assis-
tance for you in medical colleges is 
really to confer an unintended, sig-
nificant advantage on persons who 
do not deserve it. 
In India, there are a large number 
of castes. The numbers are 
limitless-there are literally hun-
dreds of castes. If you said all per-
sons belonging to a certain caste or 
from a certain section of the country 
will have a reservation of seats in 
the medical universities, it would 
not be good. Because all persons 
belonging to that caste or from a 
certain part of India are not neces-
sarily backward. Therefore, the 
concern of the Supreme Court has 
been to see that this constitutional 
purpose-a reservation for the 
deserving-is not frustrated. The 
Supreme Court must provide a 
safeguard to see that this purpose is 
not really abused or misused by 
permitting State Governments or 
the Central Government to make 
reservations for classes which do 
not deserve special consideration. 
Are the conditions of social and edu-
cational backwardness two distinctly 
independent criteria or must one be 
both socially and educationally 
backward to receive special consid-
eration under the Constitution of In-
dia? 
Both conditions need not neces-
sarily be present in any one particu-
lar situation. One condition alone 
may suffice. An individual may be 
educationally backward because 
statistics and social studies have re-
vealed that for generations there are 
castes in which education has not 
really made any appreciable impact. 
In such a situation you can say that 
this caste will receive a particular 
preference in the matter of reserva-
tions. But you could not merely say 
that all persons belonging to class 
"x" will be preferred everywhere. 
Must statistics be provided to sub-
stantiate a claim of educational or 
social backwardness in matters relat-
ing to Constitutional provisions for 
special consideration? 
In India, the law is as follows. 
Anybody who comes to the Court 
alleging that there is a law or rule 
which discriminates against him 
must show from the face of the im-
pugned law that there is in fact dis-
crimination. If that is established or 
shown, then the burden is on the 
Government-which has issued the 
notification or the rule or has passed 
the law-to justify the passing of the 
law and the furtherance of the dis-
crimination. Now that can be done 
only by citing statistics. Otherwise, 
the law will fail. 
The Government then must bear the 
burden of formulating and produc-
ing statistics? 
The burden is always on the Gov-
ernment to produce statistics to 
show that there has not been dis-
crimination towards this particular 
caste or group. 
You stated earlier that you did not 
anticipate any direct impact of the 
Bakke decision within India. Would 
you explain why you do not foresee 
someone from an educationally or 
socially advanced caste complaining 
of reverse discrimination? 
I do not think it is possible to 
complain of reverse discrimination 
in India. You see, we are still grap-
pling with our peculiar social and 
economic problems. And there are 
so many socially and economically 
backward communities and castes 
in India that we must first help them 
stand on their feet. Reverse dis-
crimination is only for very sophis-
ticated and advanced countries like 
the United States. 
But are there not demonstrators now 
protesting the special provisions 
made within the Universities of the 
State of Bihar? 
Well, the so-called "forward" 
communities are bound to revolt, 
for it is often their children who are 
denied an opportunity to gain ad-
mission into the medical colleges, 
the law colleges and other institu-
tions. 
Do you anticipate reverse discrimi-
nation becoming a legal problem in 
India within the next 5 to 10 years? 
Once the lives of a substantial 
number of citizens are improved, will 
there not be grounds for an argument 
against reverse discrimination? 
Well, there can be an argument, 
even today, about reverse discrimi-
nation. But I do not think such an 
argument has a fair chance of suc-
ceeding, given our present context 
and structure. I do not anticipate 
such an argument being made and 
succeeding for the next few years at 
least. 
Article 21 states the "No person shall 
be deprived of his life or personal 
liberty except according to proce-
dure established by law. Is the con-
cept' 'procedure established by law" 
comparable to that of "due process" 
of the law under the 5th and 14th 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution? 
At the time Article 21 was 
enacted, I do not think that the writ-
ers of the Constitution intended to 
incorporate the American concept 
of due process into Article 21. In 
fact, the debates of the Constitu-
tional Assembly would show that 
due process as a concept was dis-
cussed by our founding fathers and 
was discarded. 
Would you relate your understand-
ing of why the concept of due process 
was discarded? 
The concept of due process was 
discarded because as the American 
judges themselves have said, due 
process varies from judge to judge 
according to his own notions of 
what is constitutional and what is 
not, and what is desirable and what 
is not. Ultimately it comes to this. 
Does an individual judge think that 
it is good for the community or not? 
Then the judge brings his own social 
concepts, his own economical con-
cepts, into the decision making 
process. 
Therefore, the writers of our 
Constitution really discarded that 
concept and said there shall not be 
due process. These writers instead 
wrote that no person shall be dep-
rived of his life or personal liberty 
except according to procedure es-
tablished by law. However, by our 
recent decisions, we have almost 
imperceptibly begun to make an en-
croachment into the limited field of 
Article 21, without accepting the en-
tire American concept of due pro-
cess. 
In one of our recent judgments, 
the case of Manekha Gandhi, we 
have introduced some measure of 
the due process concept into Article 
21. And in the latest judgment of the 
Supreme Court, the President's re-
ference on the Constitutional valid-
ity of the "special courts" bill, we 
have said that it is not sufficient that 
there is some law which provides 
for the deprivation of life or per-
sonal liberty. It is necessary that 
there be a law which provides for 
the taking of life or personal liberty 
and that law has to be just and fair, 
not arbitrary or capricious. 
Would you explain your reference to 
the "special courts" bill? Does this 
bill concern the trial of Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi? 
No. This bill does not deal with 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi. It concerns 
persons who are alleged to have 
committed offenses during the 
period of the Emergency. 
Would there not be an argument that 
special courts convened to adjudicate 
the interests of one person or one 
group of people contravenes the Con-
stitutional requirement of equality 
before the law? 
( continued on page 17) 
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THE ELDERLY- SOME CONCERNS FOR LAWYERS 
Doctor Ernst is Director of Re-
search , Dallas Geriatric Research 
Institute in Dallas and adjunct pro-
fessor to the Center for Studies in 
Aging, North Texas State Univer-
sity and the Gerontology Service 
Program, University of Texas 
Health Science Center at Dallas. 
He is the author of Sensitizing 
People to the Processes of Aging, 
Recognizing Social Losses in the 
Elderly, and co-editor of Sensory 
Processes and Aging, as well as 
numerous articles in lay and profes-
sional publications. 
The most rapidly increasing seg-
ment of the American population 
are those people aged 65 or older. In 
1900, only four per cent of the total 
population in the United States was 
this age . By the year 2030, shortly 
after the baby-boom of the late 
1940's and early 1950's reach 65, it 
is estimated that 17 per cent of our 
population will be aged 65 or older. 
This represents an increase in 
people from three million in 1900 to 
twenty-two million in 1979, to fifty-
two million in 2030. 
As the aged population expands, 
both in gross numbers and in per-
centage of overall population , it be-
gins creating problems for the 
society-at-large and for us, as indi-
viduals. Society's problems emi-
nate from an increasingly depen-
dent population which has many fi-
nancial, health and adaptation prob-
lems. For individuals, it means an 
increased likelihood that we will 
come into contact with older adults 
who demand both personal and pro-
fessional time. In 1900, most of the 
elderly were still gainfully 
employed. The length of time spent 
with debilitating disease was rela-
tively short and family respon-
sibilities deemed that the family 
take care of their aging relative. In 
1979, few of the aged are gainfully 
employed. Diseases tend to be 
chronic and long-termed and family 
responsibility has been replaced by 
a highly differentiated service sys-
tem. For those of us in human ser-
vice occupations, i.e., physicians, 
social workers, lawyers, these de-
mographic changes increase the 
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probability that we will have direct 
contact, in a professional role, with 
elderly people, some of whom have 
severe problems in adjusting to old 
age. While most people over the age 
of 65 are in sound financial, physical 
and emotional shape, the older a 
person gets , the higher the likeli-
hood of deficits in several areas of 
their life. It is known, for instance, 
that only five per cent of all persons 
65 years of age or older are in in-
stitutions. Yet, that figure increases 
with age until almost 50 per cent of 
all persons over the age of 80 are so 
placed. 
As professionals who deliver a 
human service, it is essential that 
we understand some of the unique 
problems which may be facing our 
older clients. While space does not 
permit a full expose of all of the 
problems of aging, there are a 
number of crucial physical changes 
which may intrude upon the 
client-professional relationship af-
fecting the outcome of our interac-
tion with older adults. These 
changes fall within the general 
ruberic of perceptual alterations 
which may affect the older person's 
ability to intake and assimilate au-
ditory and visual stimuli. While 
these changes are not found solely 
in older adults, and while not all 
older adults suffer from these de-
ficits, there is an increased probabil-
ity of their existence in an older 
adult population. The specific 
changes to which I allude are 
changes in vision, hearing, and cog-
nitive functioning . 
As we age, most of us experience 
some decline in visual acuity. Typi-
cally, we adapt quite well to these 
slight changes. However, rapid vis-
ion loss can severely affect our in-
tegration into the world around us. 
It is known that rapid vision 
changes may occur for many people 
in the mid-forties and after the age 
of seventy. Three common vision 
difficulties are found among the el-
derly. These are: (a) Presbeopia-the 
inability to see close objects clearly; 
(b) Color Vision-red, yellow and 
orange are better seen by the aging 
eye; and (c) Cataracts, or a cloudi-
ness or opacity in the lens of the 
eye. These changes mean that de-
pendence upon a visual message for 
communication with an older per-
son is contingent upon the size of 
lettering, the color contrast on the 
printed message, and the lighting 
conditions under which the material 
is to be read. Small, black print on 
blue paper, read in high intensity 
lighting is virtually impossible for an 
older person to read. The more dif-
fused the lighting source, the more 
distinct the letters from their 
background, and the larger the 
print, the greater the probability 
that the message will be transmitted 
accurately. 
Hearing loss tends to be sex and 
occupationally related . There is lit-
tle evidence, for instance, that 
people who reside in an environ-
ment where they are not exposed to 
loud noises ever will have to lose 
auditory acuity. In our noise-
conducive society, however, re-
search findings have shown that 
men suffer auditory deficits to a 
greater extent than women, and that 
persons engaged in "high" noise 
occupations experience considera-
ble hearing loss . Evidence suggests 
that older adults experience hearing 
loss in any one of three ways. First, 
because of atrophy in the basal end 
of the organ of Corti, they experi-
ence an inability to hear high fre-
quency sounds. Second, decline in 
the number of neurons in the audit-
ory pathway causes a loss in the 
ability to discriminate speech. 
Third, because of damage to the au-
ditory canal, the volume of sound 
transmitted to the brain is di-
minished. 
The losses in auditory ability are 
extremely frustrating to most 
people. Researchers have found a 
higher rate of depression among 
older adults with hearing loss than 
among people with visual dysfunc-
tions. The most common approach 
used when an older person cannot 
hear us is to increase the volume of 
our speech. Unfortunately, the 
older adult who has experienced a 
high frequency pitch loss still can-
not distinguish what we are saying. 
Even hearing aids that increase the 
volume of the sound do not help. 
It becomes necessary to use a var-
iety of messages, rather than com-
plete dependence upon a single 
mode of communication. Auditory 
messages can be enhanced through 
the use of visual and tactile cues. 
We can be certain that the person 
knows that we are talking to them 
and we can avoid the use of 
specialized jargon which simply 
confuses the older adult who has 
never been exposed to our profes-
sional short-cuts to communication. 
Finally, a number of elderly per-
sons experience cognitive disrup-
tions which decrease their ability to 
respond to the stimuli around them. 
It is important, however, that we do 
not stereotype all elderly persons as 
being "senile." A vast amount of 
research literature suggests that 
older adults can learn and com-
prehend new material as well as 
younger people. Their basic intelli-
gence level does not decline with 
age. Conditions, however, such as 
disease, poor nutrition, or the sen-
sory deficits discussed earlier, can 
retard an older person's cognitive 
functioning. Of the entire elderly 
population, approximately six per 
cent have some degree of impaired 
mental capacity. Over the age of 85, 
this figure increases to about 20 per 
cent. It is important to note, how-
ever, that these deteriorations are 
not the result of age, per se, but 
rather atypical biological conditions 
which intrude upon the thought 
processes. Frequently evidenced in. 
memory lapses, many older adults 
with cognitive breakdown respond 
well to therapeutic intervention, 
particularly if the underlying cause 
is related to an environmental factor 
which can be controlled, such as 
with adequate nutrition or by phar-
macological intervention. 
The most important thing to re-
member when working with the 
aged client is NOT to assume that all 
people are mentally incompetent or 
physically frail simply because they 
walk with a decreased gait, have 
wrinkles, or have gray hair. Most 
elderly persons are able to adjust to 
their changing circumstance if we as 
human service delivery personnel 
allow them the opportunity to ad-
just, and are sensitive to physical 
changes which obstruct our ability 
to communicate with older adults. 
Alumni Officers Elected 
At its meeting on November 29, 
1978, the Law Alumni Association 
Council elected Edward A. Copley, 
Jr. '60 as President of the SMU Law 
Alumni Association for 1978-79. A 
partner in the firm of Akin, Gump, 
Hauer & Feld, Mr. Copley served 
as Chairman of the 1977-78 Law 
School Fund. 
Emily A. Parker '73 was elected 
Vice-President and Maurice E. 
Purnell, Jr. '66 was elected 
Secretary-Treasurer of the Associa-
tion. Robert L. (Skip) Trimble '64 
was elected to the Chairmanship of 
the 1978-79 Law School Fund. 
Thomas P. Alexander '56, Sam P. 
Burford, Jr. '67, Jack E. Crozier 
'54, Gordon Hobgood '59, Herbert 
S. Kendrick '60, Margaret Barrett 
Martin '76, George G. Potts '47, and 
Maurice E. Purnell, Jr. '66 were 
elected to the Council for three year 
terms. 
A resolution of appreciation was 
adopted thanking the members of 
the Alumni Association Council 
whose terms expired this year. 
They are Robert M. Bandy '69, 
Michael M. Boone '67, Jack L. 
Coke '43, Robert E. Davis '58, Mar-
shall J. Doke, Jr. '59, John D. 
Jackson '70, Robert L. Trimble '64 
and Ronald M. Weiss '55. 
Resolutions of appreciation were 
also adopted thanking Edward A. 
Copley for his leadership of the suc-
cessful Law School Fund, and Wil-
liam D. Powell '57 for serving as 
President of the Law Alumni As-
sociation for 1977-78. 
Legal Clinic Adds Staff Social Worker 
Beginning with the start of the 
spring semester, Mrs. Bernice 
Waldman, A.C.S.W., S.P., be-
comes the first Director of Social 
Services for the SMU Legal Clinic 
programs. Funded with a grant from 
the Greater Dallas Section of the 
National Council of Jewish Women, 
Mrs. Waldman brings a range of ex-
perience to the Legal Clinic that var-
ies from private practice in indi-
vidual and group therapy to work as 
a psychiatric social worker for the 
Dallas County Mental Health Dis-
trict. 
Mrs. Waldman will be responsi-
ble for recruiting and training a 
small cadre of volunteers to assist 
her in her responsibilities. Together 
with her volunteers, Mrs. Waldman 
will provide clinic students from all 
three clinics with a wide variety of 
services designed to enhance the 
lawyering process. For example, 
Criminal Clinic students will be able 
to request presentence reports and 
suggestions for suitable sentencing 
alternatives. On the civil side of the 
docket, Mrs. Waldman and her vol-
unteers will be heavily involved in 
many phases of the child custody 
cases and the juvenile delinquency 
cases that are assigned to each stu-
dent in the Civil Clinic. 
Professor Steele, Associate Dean 
for Clinical Education, initially ap-
proached the Dallas Section of the 
National Council of Jewish Women 
with the idea. "I want the students 
to leave the clinic with a better un-
derstanding of where a lawyer's 
work begins and ends and where the 
work of other trained professionals 
commences, " Steele said. "I am 
very gratified by the enthusiastic re-
sponse of the National Council to 
this idea. I know that our students 
will learn about what social work 
can do for their clients, but more 
importantly, I hope that they learn 
about the difference between law 
and social work," Steele com-
mented. 
15 
Telefund Results Predict 
Record 
Law School Fund 
Robert L. (Skip) Trimble '64, 
Chairman of the 1978-79 Law 
School Fund, announced that this 
year's telefund raised a record 
$92,000 in pledges surpassing the 
best previous total by 21%. 
During the first two weeks of 
February, law alumni met each 
night in Lawyers Inn and called 
classmates for contributions to the 
scholarship fund for law students. 
In all, 75 alumni gave of their time 
and talent to insure a successful 
telefund. Also, the Barristers con-
ducted follow-up telephoning on the 
final night of the telefund. 
Assistant Dean Coultas attri-
buted the tremendous success of the 
telefund to Skip Trimble, a member 
of the Dallas firm of Winstead, 
McGuire, Sechrest & Trimble. 
"Skip's leadership was evident in 
the selection of team captains and 
workers which served to establish 
an organization dedicated to making 
this telefund the best ever. Also, our 
alumni were receptive to the callers 
and sympathetic to the plight of our 
law students faced with annual in-
creases in tuition," stated Coultas. 
This year's Law School Fund drive 




James E. Coleman, Chairman of 
the 1978-79 Law Library Fund an-
nounced that this year's furid has 
exceeded last year's record total of 
$17,280. This special solicitation is 
separate from the annual Law 
School Fund and is solely for the 
support of the Underwood Law 
Library. 
Mr. Coleman, a University of 
Virginia Law School graduate and 
member of the Dallas firm of Car-
rington, Coleman, Sloman, Johnson 
& Blumenthal, asked area law firms 
and sole practitioners to join with 
him and assist the law library in 
maintaining its superb collection. 
The response was generous with at-
torneys indicating they particularly 
value the resources available in the 
library and the capable assistance of 
Law Librarian Earl Borgeson and 
his staff. 
Alumni hard at work during the annual telefund. 
16 
The argument has in fact been po-
sited. But you see, this again con-
cerns the theory of classification . 
The Supreme Court has held that 
the classification of individuals who 
have committed crimes during the 
Emergency is a very valid classifica-
tion. I delivered the majority judg-
ment for the Court which consisted 
of a Bench of seven, and wrote that 
persons who are alleged to have 
committed offenses during the 
Emergency and persons who are al-
leged to have committed offenses in 
normal times are two classes. 
Therefore, you can enact a special 
law for persons who have commit-
ted or who are alleged to have com-
mitted offenses during the period of 
the Emergency. 
Article 31 provides for Compulsory 
Acquisition of Property. Article 31, 
subdivision (1) states that "no person 
shall be deprived of his property save 
by authority of law." Have the re-
quirements of a "just and fair" law 
been judicially imposed upon this 
provision also? 
Not exactly. Under our Constitu-
tion, property can only be taken 
away from the inoividual if for a 
public purpose, because the right to 
own property is a fundamental 
right. Article 31, subdivision (l) 
holds that no person shall be de-
prived of his property save by au-
thority of law. And subdivision 
(2-A) of Article 31 states that a pub-
lic purpose is one which involves 
the transfer of ownership or right of 
possession of any property to the 
State or to a corporation owned or 
controlled by the State. We have 
now interpreted those provisions to 
mean that it is not necessary to pay 
the market value or its just equiva-
lent for acquiring private property 
for a public purpose. But we have 
also said in some decisions that this 
does not mean usury compensation. 
The amount of compensation paid 
to acquire private property for a 
public purpose must bear some 
nexus with the market value. 
Would you clarify further what the 
Supreme Court has meant by "some 
nexus to the fair market value?" 
We have more specifically refer-
red to a "rational" nexus. For 
example, in one of my judgments I 
said, if the Constitution confers a 
fundmental right to own property 
and if it provides that private prop-
erty shall not be taken by the State 
except for public purpose, then you 
cannot take a person's "fortune for 
a farthing and mock at his property 
right." Thus, there must be a ra-
tional nexus between what the state 
pays to the private property owner 
and the market value of the prop-
erty. 
One further question with regard to 
Article 31. Article 31, subdivision 
(2), provides that the amount of 
payment determined by the State 
cannot be challenged in a Court of 
law. Does this not preclude any ad-
judication of the "rational nexus" 
requirement? 
Well, the amount can in fact be 
challenged. Article 31, subdivision 
(2) has been amended and the 
amount of payment can be chal-
lenged in the courts. And further-
more, in some of the cases the chal-
lenge has, to a limited extent, been 
upheld by us. 
Would Article 31, subdivision (2-A) 
allow private property to be acquired 
pursuant to a State law which cannot 
be said to be a "compulsory acquisi-
tion" because there will not be a 
transfer of property to the State? In 
other words, does Article 31 (2-A) 
permit private property to be taken 
when it is not to be used for a public 
purpose? 
A law may deprive an individual 
of his property but not provide for 
the vesting of title to that property in 
the State. Such a law would not be 
"compulsory acquisition" as de-
nominated by Article 31. But the 
law would nevertheless be valid. 
For example, supposing "A's" 
property has been taken for a public 
purpose, but for the use of some 
corporation which is not State-
owned. In such a case, the property 
does not vest in the State. It is then 
not "compulsory acquisition." But 
the property may still be taken ifit is 
for a public purpose, if it is for the 
purpose and benefit of the entire 
community, although the object of 
the law is not to vest title in the 
State. If a private property right is 
extinguished and correspondingly a 
right in the property is created in the 
State, then the law is for a public 
purpose and simultaneously '· com-
pulsory acquisition''. But the law 
must be for a public purpose in 
order to take private property val-
idly. 
What are the legal ramifications of 
the situation wherein "A's" prop-
erty is taken for a public purpose but 
title to such property does not vest in 
the State? 
Compensation must still be paid 
for this property. But in fact, the 
majority of compensation payments 
which have been made in our coun-
try have been incurred under Sec-
tion 23 of the Land Acquisition Act 
which provides for the payment of 
the full market price. 
One provision of the Indian Constitu-
tion differs markedly from that of the 
United States Constitution. Article 
143 allows the President of India to 
consult and obtain the advice of the 
Supreme Court upon a matter of 
public importance. Would you com-
ment on this? Under the United 
States Constitution, such conduct 
would constitute an advisory opinion 
by the Supreme Court and would be 
disallowed as a violation of the sep-
aration of the Executive and Judicial 
branches of Government. 
The President, of course, means 
the Council of Ministers. But you 
see, in the United States the juris-
diction of the Supreme Court is li-
mited to cases and controversies. 
We do not have that clause in our 
Constitution. And there is no provi-
sion in the United States Constitu-
tion corresponding to Article 143. 
That is why the American Supreme 
Court does not give any advisory 
opinions. It is only if a case or a 
controversy arises that the United 
States Supreme Court will give its 
opinion. 
Does the provision of Article 143 
within the Indian Constitution in any 
degree derogate from the Supreme 
Court's independence as a separate 
Branch of Government? 
No, it does not. Because we are 
asked for our advisory opinion upon 
a legal question, not a political ques-
tion. If the Executive Branch of 
Government were to ask for an ad-
visory opinion on a political ques-
tion, we would generally decline. 
The Supreme Court is not compel-
led to answer. Article 143 uses the 
word "may" rather than "shall." 
We will not entertain and respond to 
( continued on next page) 
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a political matter unless the political 
question is very vague. 
Does the giving of advisory opinions 
consume a great deal of the Court's 
time? 
No, for there have been very few 
opinions provided. During the last 
28 years that our Constitution has 
been in existence, there have been 
seven or eight references, approxi-
mately one every three or four 
years. 
Would an advisory opinion have the 
same force and effect as a legal deci-
sion rendered by the Supreme 
Court? 
That is a very sensitive problem. 
The question becomes this-is the 
advisory opinion binding as law de-
clared by the Supreme Court under 
Article 141. Article 141 of the Con-
stitution says that the law declared 
by the Supreme Court is binding 
upon all the courts in India. If that is 
so, then the question is whether the 
advisory opinion is law. And the 
majority of our decisions so far have 
taken the view that an advisory 
opinion is not law and therefore, it is 
not binding. But in the latest cases, 
for instance, that of the "special 
courts bill," we have slightly struck 
a new path and our position has be-
come that we do not see any valid 
reason for holding that an advisory 
opinion is not binding as law. This is 
so because we give an advisory 
opinion after hearing all the parties 
which are interested in the problem. 
So why should it be that a decision 
in a private case between ••A'' and 
"B" on a question of law will bind 
an entire country, but a decision on 
a very important question, given 
after hearing every conceivable 
party which is interested in that 
question, will bind no one? 
Does not Article 143 also raise the 
question of equality before the law, 
when the President or Council of 
Ministers may go directly to the Sup-
reme Court for a decision on a ques-




We have always taken the view, 
as have the American courts and 
every court in the world, that the 
Government is entitled to be treated 
differently from the private citizen 
in many matters. For example, if a 
person should occupy forcibly any 
property belonging to the Govern-
ment, then there are laws made in 
several parts of the world under 
which the Government can sum-
marily remove that person. A pri-
vate person could not. But those 
laws have been upheld because the 
Government is entitled to be treated 
somewhat differently in some mat-
ters. 
I would like to direct the next few 
questions to the Constitutional provi-
sions for a State of Emergency in In-
dia. Article 352 (1) and (3) state that 
the President can declare a state of 
emergency or Proclamation of 
Emergency if a grave emergency 
exists-such as war, external ag-
gression or internal disturbance--or 
if such a grave emergency appears to 
be imminently dangerous. In your 
opinion, were such grave conditions 
in existence when Mrs. Indira Gan-
dhi declared the State of Emergency 
on June 26, 1975, and if so, what 
were these condittions? 
Well, this is a typical political 
question, which a Judge finds very 
diffiicult to answer. A Judge really 
has no means of ascertaining the 
answer. But the Emergency was 
proclaimed on the basis that there 
were such conditions. Whether 
there were in fact such conditions or 
not-well the Judge has no means of 
determining this. 
Article 352 (5) (b) states that the 
Proclamation of Emergency is final 
and conclusive. It cannot be chal-
lenged in any court of law in India. 
Does that provision cause you con-
cern? 
Yes, well it does concern every 
Judge that any declaration of 
emergency should be treated as 
conclusive. 
Moreover, there are no provisions in 
the Constitution for any periodic re-
view of the Proclamation of 
Emergency. Do the possibilities for 
abuse disturb you? 
It is quite right that there are no 
present provisions for review. But 
the Constitution is being amended 
to provide for periodic review. I 
have not yet seen this amendment 
which was passed by Parliament. 
But I believe the amendment pro-
vides that the Proclamation must be 
reviewed every six months or after a 
certain period of time. And if not 
reviewed, the Proclamation au-
tomatically lapses. 
Article 352 (2) (c) presently requires 
approval by resolution of both 
Houses of Parliament within two 
months after the Proclamation of 
Emergency has been declared. How 
much Parliamentary approval is 
required-two-thirds, a simple 
majority? 
I think it is by simple majority, 
but I am not quite certain. 
One final question, Mr. Chief Jus-
tice: Article 71 of the 1976 edition of 
the Constitution states that Parlia-
ment may by law regulate the elec-
tion of the President or Vice-
President, including the grounds on 
which such election may be ques-
tioned. Article 71 (3) states that the 
validity of this law may not be ques-
tioned in any court. Has this article 
been amended? 
This article has in fact been 
amended several times. It was first 
amended to provide for the creation 
of a separate tribunal for challeng-
ing the election of the President, the 
Vice President and the Prime Minis-
ter. But that amendment was 
amended to provide that such elec-
tions will not be challenged in a 
court of law. I believe the present 
Government has some different 
thinking on this latter amendment. 
But presently, as matters stand to-
day, I believe the President's elec-
tion or the Prime Minister's election 
cannot be challenged, in accor-
dance with the original provisions 
(1950) of the Constitution. 
Thank you Mr. Chief Justice Chan-
drachud for responding so candidly 
to my questions. 
The Honorable 
A. Leon Higginbotham 
On March 2, Judge A. Leon Hig-
ginbotham of the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit delivered the 
Second Annual Roy R. Ray Lecture 
entitled ''From Thomas Jefferson to 
Bakke - Race and The American 
Legal Process." 
The Judge was greeted by an en-
thusiastic standing room only 
crown in Karcher Auditorium. The 
theme of Judge Higginbotham's 
speech mirrored his critically 
acclaimed book "In The Matter of 
Color - Race and The American 
Legal Process: The Colonial 
Period." The book is the first in a 
series to be published by the Judge 
on race relations and the legal pro-
cess in the United States. 
The lecture provided disturbing 
insights into the treatment of blacks 
during the American Colonial 
Period and disclosed how the laws 
of the various colonies sanctioned 
the unequal treatment of blacks. 
Colonial newspapers ran adver-
tisements offering slaves for sale as 
well as rewards for returning runa-
way slaves who "had done nothing 
except dared to dream that they too 
could be free." The graphic depic-
tions of the slave trade and treat-
ment of slaves used by Judge Hig-
ginbotham throughout the speech 
were intended to raise the student's 
consciousness to a new plateau that 
Second Annual 
Roy R. Ray Lecture 
A Great Success 
hopefully would be reflected in their 
practice of Ia w. At the conclusion of 
the speech, he received a standing 
ovation. 
Later in the afternoon, Judge 
Higginbotham met informally with 
students and answered questions 
about constitutional law, race rela-
tions, and other topics of current 
interest. All were impressed by the 
Judge's immense knowledge of 
legal history and grasp of constitu-
tional law. As one student later 
stated, "Being able to listen to and 
ask questions of Judge Higgin-
botham was a highlight of my law 
school career." 
The annual Roy R. Ray Lecture 
was established at the SMU School 
of Law by Professor Emeritus of 
Law Roy R. Ray. Through Profes-
sor Ray's generosity the School of 
Law is able to bring a scholar of 
national eminence to campus for a 
lecture and discussion of a legal 
topic of current interest to law stu-
dents, lawyers, judges and the 
community at large. 
Judge Higginbotham interpreting a point of law. 
19 
Brice and Barron Fund 
Videotape Series 
Professor Walter Steele , As-
sociate Dean for Clinical Educa-
tion, has announced that the firm of 
Brice and Barron, Dallas, Texas, 
has provided the law school with 
funding for production of a series of 
videotapes to demonstrate various 
steps in the lawyering process, with 
emphasis on court-room procedure. 
Professor Steele explained that 
those involved in clinical education 
have noted the frequent repetitive-
ness of the problems students com-
monly face as they progress through 
their clinical experiences. The idea 
for the use of videotape stems from 
the assumption that it will save 
supervisors' time, and provide the 
student with an enhanced under-
standing of the process about which 
he seeks to learn if, instead of hav-
ing his question answered orally by 
a supervisor, the student's question 
is answered by watching a brief vid-
eotape presentation of a lawyer en-
gaged in that very process. 
Examples of some of the topics to 
be covered by the tapes are: How to 
Qualify an Expert Witness, Con-
ducting a Child Support Contempt 
Hearing, How to Take a Witness on 
Voir Dire, etc. Production of the 
tapes has already begun, Professor 
Steele announced. The tapes are 
being prepared in cooperation with 
the Southern Methodist University 
Department of Media Services and 
will be of a high professional quality 
suitable for use in other law schools, 
according to Professor Steele. 
"We are very grateful to the firm 
of Brice and Barron for the interest 
and originality shown by them in 
making it possible for us to produce 
this innovative series of films. I be-
lieve that this effort is a major step 
forward in the methodology of clini-
cal education," stated Professor 
Steele. 
20 
Crow Speaks at First 
Strasburger & Price 
Lecture 
Trammell Crow, local real estate 
developer and entrepreneur, joined 
with Don Williams, attorney and 
managing partner of the Trammell 
Crow Company, in presenting the 
First Annual Strasburger & Price 
Lecture at the School of Law. 
Mr. Crow and Mr. Williams led 
an enthusiastic audience in an in-
formal discussion of current trends 
in real estate law and the inner 
workings of the Trammell Crow 
Company. Numerous questions 
from the audience provided those in 
attendance with a unique opportun-
ity to learn about the Dallas real es-
tate business from the man whose 
company built Bryan Tower, the 
World Trade Center and Loews 
Anatole Hotel. 
The Annual Strasburger & Price 
Lecture Series was recently estab-
lished at the School of Law by the 
Dallas law firm of Strasburger & 
Price for the continued enhance-
ment of the educational environ-
ment at SMU and in the Dallas 
Community. 
The Placement Office at the Law 
School is always ready to serve the 
need for associates or students for 
part time work. Resumes can be 
sent or the rirm can set up an in-
terview with our students at the 
School. About three weeks advance 
notice should be given. 
Tartt Hosts 
Houston Reception 
Blake Tartt (' 59) and his wife 
Barbara opened their home to 
Houston area law alumni in 
mid-April for the annual reception. 
Dean Ad Interim A. J. Thomas, 
Jr., Associate Dean for Clinical 
Education Walter Steele , and Assis-
tant Dean Edward 0. Coultas at-
tended from Dallas. The Dean Ad 
Interim briefly described recent de-
velopments at the School of Law. It 
was noted that both the quality and 
quantity of applicants to the School 
continue to increase even though 
tuition and fees for the next 
academic year will be approxi-
mately $4800. 
The event was well attended by 
the growing number of Houston 




William J. McGowan, II ('70) of 
Brownfield hosted a reception for 
North Texas area alumni at the 
Lubbock Club in early May. 
Dean Ad Interim A. J. Thomas, 
Jr. addressed the group of alumni 
and noted that although the Dean 
Search Committee has been hard at 
work, it does not appear that the 
Dean vacancy will be filled by the 
beginning of the fall term. 
Several attorneys traveled to 
Lubbock from surrounding towns 
to meet with the Dean Ad Interim, 
learn about the School and visit with 
other alumni in the North Texas 
area. 
Faculty Notes 
Professor Thomas B. Black spoke in 
March to the Federal Bar Association's 
1979 Southwestern Region Conference 
in Dallas. His subject was "Evidence -
A Comparison of Texas Common Law 
and the Federal Rules." 
Dean Charles O. Galvin spoke to the 
Town & Gown Club on March 19, 1979. 
His subject was "John Adams & 
Thomas Jefferson to Racehorse Haynes 
& Melvin Belli." 
Professor John Kennedy spoke on 
Federal Jurisdiction at the Dallas Bar 
Association's Basic Federal Practice 
Seminar in January. He also spoke on 
Federal Practice and Procedure at the 
Federal Bar Association's 1979 South-
west Regional Conference in Dallas in 
March and was a panelist at the Work-
shop on Class Actions in Title VII Liti-
gation, Labor Law Section, at the Ar-
kansas Bar Association in Arkadelphia 
in March. 
Professor Frederick C. Moss acted as 
the Assistant Team Leader to Professor 
Robert Keeton of Harvard University at 
the National SemiRar For Advanced 
Trial Advocacy held March 14-18, at the 
University of Florida at Gainsville. 
Associate Dean S. Theodore Reiner de-
Ii vered a paper entitled "Effects of 
Governmental Incentives and Disincen-
tives on Petroleum Production: Federal 
Taxation a Case in Point," at the 
Southwest Legal Foundation's 19th 
Annual Institute on Petroleum Explora-
tion & Economics. 
Professor Jeswald W. Salacuse lec-
tured in March at the Near East Studies 
Center of UCLA on the topic "Trilat-
eral Investments in the Middle East: Is 
Three a Crowd?" He also attended the 
meeting of the Committee on Law in the 
Middle East of the Social Science Re-
search Council in New York City. 
Professor Daniel W. Shuman spoke to 
Audiologists and Speech Pathologists at 
SMU on "Legal Rights and Respon-
sibilities of Teachers in Education of the 
Handicapped.'' 
PERHAPS 
Professor William P. Streng partici-
pated (March 15-16) in the Washington 
D.C. national meeting of the Interna-
tional Fiscal Association with respect to 
U.S. Tax Treaties . He also spoke at The 
American Management Association 
Dallas International Taxation Program 
(March 19) on Overseas Executive 
Compensation Planning. 
Dean Ad Interim A. J. Thomas, Jr. 
spoke before the Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce Symposium on "Maritime 
Aviation Losses and Conflict of Law" 
at the new Loews Anatole Hotel in Dal-
las. 
Professor Peter Winship spoke to the 
Dallas Bar Association's Corporate 
Counsel Section on "The Proposed 
Federal Securities Code." He has also 
been elected Vice-Chairperson of the 
Section of Commercial, Contract and 
Related Consumer Law of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools for 
1979-80 and Chairperson-designate of 
that Section for 1980-81. 
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H. Fred Martin, Jr., Judge for the Oc-
cupational Safety & Review Commis-
sion attended a judicial seminar at 
Dartmouth College, in Hanover, New 
Hampshire, November 6-9, 1978. 
1935 
R. L. Dillard, Jr., retired October 1, 
1978 as General Counsel of Southland 
Life Insurance Co., after 33 years of 
service. Mr. Dillard is currently "of 
Counsel" to Saner, Jack, Sallinger & 
Nichols in Dallas. 
1948 
James 0. Faires and Edgar J. Garrett, 
Jr. ('75), have formed the partnership of 
Faires & Garrett in Dallas. 
1949 
Roderick L. Shaw, began another 4-year 
term as County Judge in Lubbock in 
January 1, 1979. This will mark the 15th 
year Judge Shaw has served as County 
Judge in Lubbock. 
1953 
Robert J. Cowan, of Midland, has been 
certified in Estate Planning and Probate 
Law by the Texas Board of Legal 
Specialization. 
1954 
Joe B. Brown, was appointed by the Dal-
las County Commissioner's Court to 
serve as Judge of County Court at Law 
No. 2 in Dallas. 
Robert A. Gwinn, of Seay, Gwinn, 
Crawford, Mebus & Blakeney, has been 
certified a Specialist in Personal Injury 
Trial. Mr. Gwinn has also been elected a 
Director of the Dallas Bar Association 
1979-80. ' 
1955 
Aubrey V. Burkett, is District Counsel 
for the Forth Worth District of the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. 
Rufus Higginbotham, has been 
employed as Assistant to Dr. W. A. 
Criswell of the First Baptist Church in 
Dallas since March, 1977. 
1957 
C. R. Anderson, moved to Brecken-
ridge, Texas upon graduation in 1957. 
He is presently serving as General 
Counsel for the Petroleum Corporation 
of Texas in Breckenridge. 
1959 
Gene Ater, formerly a partner in the 
Odessa law firm of Ater & Hirsch, was 
elected Judge of the 70th Judicial Dis-
22 
trict Court in November, 1978, and was 
sworn into office on January 1, 1979. 
Ernest Steve Watson, is Vice President 
and General Counsel of the First Arkan-
sas Bankstock Corporation in Little 
Rock. 
1961 
Charles Joplin, has served as President 
of the New Mexico Bankers Associa-
tion, and is on the Board of Directors of 
the El Paso Branch of the Federal Re-
serve Bank and the Board of Regents of 
the New Mexico Military Institute. Mr. 
Joplin is now with the Security National 
Bank in Roswell. 
Scott Wang, is associated with the Leo 
A. Daly Co. of Omaha, Nebraska. 
1962 
Reese L. Harris, was certified in 1978 by 
the Texas Board of Legal Specialization 
as a Specialist in Civil Trial Law. 
E. Lawrence Merriman, has recently 
moved to Longview and is with the firm 
of Nichols & Parker. 
Benjamin L. Sturgeon, has established 
his own law office in Amarillo. 
1963 
Robert Bush, is currently serving his 
second term as a member of the Texas 
House of Representatives. He is also 
serving on the Appropriations and Bus-
iness and Industry Committees. 
1964 
Fred Kolodey, of Kolodey & Thomas, 
has been elected to the Board of Direc-
tors of Farah Manufacturing Co. 
1965 
Robert M. Blackmon, was sworn in as 
Judge, County Court at Law No . 1, 
Nueces County, on January 1, 1979. 
Gayle Goldstrich Cannon, is currently 
Assistant General Counsel for the Pizza 
Inn, Inc. in Dallas. 
1966 
Larry Feldman, has been elected to 
Who's Who In American Law Marquis. 
He has also been certified by the State 
Bar of Texas as a Specialist of Personal 
Injury Trial Law and Civil Trial Law. 
1967 
George G. Brin, of the Corpus Christi 
firm of Dyer & Redford, will assume the 
position of President of the Neuces 
County Bar Association in June, 1979. 
R. Mack Lewis, Jr., became associated 
with the firm of Malouf, Lynch & 
Jackson in Dallas on January 1, 1979. 
He was formerly Vice-President and 
Trust Officer at the First National Bank 
in Dallas. 
1968 
Jerry John Crawford, has been elected 
County Judge in Denton, Texas, and 
began his term on January 1, 1979. 
Peter G. Keane, has recently been ap-
pointed Chief Assistant Public Defender 
in San Francisco, California. 
John P. Krouse, was certified a 
Specialist of Criminal Law by the Texas 
State Bar Board of Legal Specialization 
in December, 1978. 
Robert N. Virden, was certified in De-
cember, 1978 by the Texas State Board 
of Legal Specialization as a Specialist in 
Estate Planning & Probate Law. Mr. 
Virden is currently Vice-President & 
Trust Officer in charge of Estate & Per-
sonal Trust Administration at the Texas 
American Bank in Dallas. 
1969 
Charles H. Robertson and Ronald L. 
Wilkinson ('66) have relocated and in-
corporated. Included among the 
employees of the professional corpora-
tion of Robertson & Wilkinson, Inc. of 
Dallas are Thomas Railsback ('69) and 
Elizabeth Segovis ('78). 
Larry Silver, is Tax Manager of Mil-
chem, Inc., in Houston. He is also a 
member of the Texas State Board of 
CPA's. 
Mike M. Tabor, of Dallas, has been cer-
tified as Specialist in Civil Trial Law by 
the Texas State Board of Legal 
Specialization. 
1970 
Thomas R. Adkins, is presently Assis-
tant Regional Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Energy in Dallas. 
Ronald L. Goranson, is Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Dallas 
County Criminal Bar Association, 1979. 
Sandy Kaufman, has rejoined the firm of 
Touche, Ross & Co. in Dallas as Man-
ager in the Tax Department. Mr. Kauf-
man previously worked with the firm as 
an intern while attending the Law 
School. 
1971 
Ira D. Elnsohn, has become a partner in 
the Dallas firm of Gardere, Porter & 
DeHay on January 1, 1979. 
Al Ellis, has been chosen Boss of the 
Year 1978, by the Dallas Association of 
Legal Secretaries. 
Stephen C. Mahood, is Vice-
President & General Counsel of 
SEDCO, Inc., in Dallas. 
1972 
Steve Barnett (LLM '76) was elected 
Assistant Secretary - Corporate Attor-
ney of Dresser Industries, Inc. in Dal-
las. 
William Frank Carroll, of the Dallas 
firm of Clark, West, Keller, Sanders & 
Butler has been elected Vice-President 
of the Dallas Association of Young 
Lawyers. 
Jay Counts, has recently returned to 
Dallas from Washington, D. C. to prac-
tice labor law with the firm of Hewett 
Johnson Swanson & Barbee. 
1973 
Fred Biery, has been elected Judge of 
County Court No. 2, Bexar County, 
Texas, effective January I, 1979. Mr. 
Biery was formerly in private practice. 
John S. Bordelon and Jean C. Breaux, 
Jr. have formed the partnership of 
Bordelon and Breaux in Lafayette, 
Louisiana, specializing in the practice of 
taxation and estate planning. 
Donald E. Godwin, became a partner in 
the Dallas firm of Seay, Gwinn, Craw-
ford, Mebus & Blakeney on January I, 
1979. 
R. Brent Harshman, has accepted a pos-
ition in the Legal Department of 
Diamond Shamrock Corporation, Oil 
and Gas Unit in Amarillo, Texas. Mr. 
Harshman was formerly with the Texas 
Gas Transmission Corporation in Hous-
ton. 
Donald Stevenson, has been employed 
as Associate General Counsel & Corpo-
rate Secretary for Hunt International 
Resources Corporation in Dallas since 
December 1978. 
Henry H. Werner, is a partner in the 
newly established firm of Gunn, Stuc-
key & Werner in Kansas City, Missouri. 
1974 
William Alan Bell, has been appointed to 
the position of Vice-President in charge 
of legal affairs for Florida Hospital As-
sociates. 
Burton Cohen, is currently involved in 
financial planning and investment advis-
ing in El Paso, Texas. 
William S. Hart, recently formed the 
professional corporation of Legg & Hart 
in Houston. Mr. Hart is also serving as 
adjunct professor at South Texas Col-
lege of Law where he is teaching Bills & 
Notes for the Spring Semester, 1979. 
Douglas B. Owen, has been promoted to 
tJ1e Chief of the State & County Affairs 
Division, serving under Mark White, 
Attorney General of Texas. 
Peter G. Pierce, III was elected to the 
City Council of the City of Nichols 
Hills, Oklahoma, on April 3, 1979. 
William Dixon Wiles, became a partner 
in the Dallas firm of Bailey, Williams, 
Westfall, Lee & Fowler on January I, 
1979. 
1975 
Steven R. Fredrickson, is an Assistant 
City Attorney with the Minneapolis City 
Attorney's Office. 
Edward F. Gilhooly, is practicing 
maritime law as well as petroleum mar-
keting law in the Law Department of 
Gulf Oil Corporation in Bala Cynwyd, 
Pennsylvania. 
Robert W. Hutcheson, is the Referee for 
the Probate & Juvenile Courts, Greene 
County, Ohio. He is also an associate of 
Wead & Aultman in Xenia, Ohio. 
George White, has established his own 
private law practice in Irving. 
1976 
Richard J. Billik, Jr., is an attorney with 
the U. S. Department of Justice, Anti-
trust Division, in Washington, D.C. 
Edward C. Hertenstein, is presently as-
sociated with the firm of Emens, Hurd, 
Kegler & Ritter in Columbus, Ohio. 
Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., was elected 
prosecuting attorney of Cape Girardeau 
County, Missouri on November 7, 1978. 
Juliet Ling-Ling Lam, is currently work-
ing as a real estate agent with the Bill 
Rush Company in Richardson. 
Linda S. Robinson, is an Assistant Pro-
secutor in St. Charles County, Mis-
souri. 
William D. Sheppard, is now serving' 'of 
Counsel" with the firm of Woolsey, 
Fisher, Whiteaker & Stenger in 
Springfield, Missouri. 
1977 
John M. Alton, of the Columbus, Ohio 
firm of Lane, Alton & Horst is specializ-
ing in litigation, predominantly repre-
senting insurance companies. 
Paul N. Gold, is associated with the Dal-
las law firm of Wilson, Menaker and 
Branson. 
Alexander William Kent, has estab-
lished his law office and is concentrating 
on the practice of domestic and interna-
tional law in Coral Gables, Florida. 
Marcy Kelley Leachman, is associated 
with the Dallas firm of Locke, Purnell, 
Boren, Laney & Neely. 
Robert T. Mowrey, became associated 
with the Dallas firm of Locke, Purnell, 
Boren, Laney &NeelyinJanuary, 1979. 
He previously clerked for the Honora-
ble Harry Phillips, Chief Judge, U. S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
Paul G. Yale, is presently working for 
the Dallas firm of Kolodey & Thomas. 
1978 
Lawrence G. Boyd, is working in litiga-
tion for the Dallas firm of Johnston and 
Feather. 
Todd A. Hunter, is practicing law with 
the Corpus Christi firm of Meredith, 
Donnell & Edmonds. 
Kip Merrill Kugler, is practicing law 
with the Dallas firm of Fiedler & Fortes-
cue. 
Thomas J. Sagehorn, is now working as 
Legal Counsel for Ponderosa Systems, 
Inc., in Dayton, Ohio. His legal respon-
sibilities will primarily relate to land ac-
quisition, building construction and 
lease negotiation for Ponderosa restaur-
ants. 
Charla J. H. Tindall, is practicing law at 
the Dallas law office of Patricia A. Hill. 
Mrs. Tindall has been concentrating in 
the areas of medical malpractice, estate 
& probate and family law. She attended 
a medical seminar in Antwerp, Belgium 
in September 1978. · 
MARRIAGES 
Richard J. Billick '76 to Alison R. 
Umstead. 
Robert M. Blackmon '65 to Marta An-
gola MCL '64 of Buenos Aires, Argen-
tina. 
Linda S. Robinson '76 to Kent W. Fan-
ning. 
BIRTHS 
Alexander William Kent '77 and his wife 
became the happy parents of a baby girl, 
Alexandra Johanna, in May, 1978. 
Steve A. Mandell '77 and his wife Eileen 
proudly announce the birth of their son, 
Josh, born January 11, 1979. 
Hal Moorman '76 and his wife are the 
proud parents of a son, Ted Moorman, 
born January 4, 1979. 
Alvin A. Ohm '68 and his wife Jean 
proudly announce the birth of their 
daughter, Megan Kathleen, born Feb-
ruary 2, 1979. 
DEATHS 
Mildred Louise Everett Vilott '74, on Oc-
tober 18, 1978. 
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"History is a voice forever sounding 
across the centuries the laws of 
right and wrong. Opinions alter, 
manners change, creeds rise and fall, 
· but the moral law is written on 
the tablets of eternity. For every false 
word or unrighteous deed, for 
cruelty and oppression, for lust or vanity, 
the price has to be paid at last; not 
always by the chief offenders, but paid 
by someone. Justice and truth alone 
endure and live. Injustice and 
falsehood may be long-lived, but 
doomsday comes at last to them, 
in French Revolutions and other 
terrible ways." James Anthony Froude 
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